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Boris Kagarlitsky on the US elections, Trump, peace talks and radical changes Boris Yulievich: Will the new US president influence the conflict between Russia and Ukraine? Boris Kagarlitsky: For a long time, the Russian elites have been under the illusion that Trump's rise to power in the United States will solve all our problems. It is unclear how he will do this; magical thinking is already kicking in. Somehow everything will be fixed. And only by the beginning of this autumn did they realize two things. First, Trump will most likely not return to the White House. And second, if he does return, it will be even worse. Trump really is not interested in Ukraine. And if the Russians want to do something bad to it, then that is not his problem. But Putin can only be given freedom in the Ukrainian issue under one very important condition. Russia must become America's key ally in the fight against China. For Trump, the Chinese threat is an obsession (as is opposition to migration from Mexico). It is clear that for the Russian economy, given its increased dependence on China, such a turn to the West would be a disaster. And the geopolitical prospects are dubious. After all, we have a multi-kilometer land border with China, not the United States. So the friendship of Trump's Republicans is much more dangerous for Moscow than the enmity of the Democrats, who can ultimately be bought off with cosmetic reforms in politics and concessions in Ukraine. Moreover, the Ukrainian conquests are in fact of no value to the Russian economy; the war is not for territory, but for preserving the political regime in Moscow unchanged. But the Western elites will not demand deep democratization; for them, it will be quite enough to renovate the facade of the state in accordance with the requirements of liberal decency. This is well understood by the moderately pragmatic faction in the Kremlin. Finally, we must understand the role of China in this scenario. Not only is it important for Beijing to keep Trump out of the White House, the economic interests of the Celestial Empire require the restoration of transit of goods to Western Europe via the Trans-Siberian Railway through Russia and Ukraine. Therefore, the Chinese need peace between these two countries, and Russia not to conflict with the West, so that the borders are open and transparent. Simple Economics. And if in the first years of the conflict the damage from the loss of transit was compensated by the conquest of the Russian market, now this market has been captured, and problems may arise in the European markets. So, not only is peace needed, but we need to hurry with it. Thus a new configuration emerges. For Harris are the Chinese comrades and Moscow pragmatists, for Trump are several very influential madmen in the ranks of the Russian elite. Boris Yulievich: While Trump was the US President, he started building a wall between the US and Mexico. This looks very much like a mega-project to enrich himself at the construction site. At the same time, Trump redistributed the budget from the military-industrial complex in favor of this wall. In addition, Trump did not start new wars, but only ended old conflicts that he inherited from previous administrations. Can we say on this basis that Trump is supported by the most peaceful part of American capital? In any case, that part of capital that wants to bury money under the wall, and not develop military production? Boris Kagarlitsky: Trump really does lobby for the interests of the construction business. By the way, a fair share of the orders for construction work in connection with the construction of the wall would go to Mexico. And most of the migrants rushing to the United States are not from there, but from even poorer countries south of Yucatan. So, regardless of Trump's rhetoric, there will be no conflict with Mexico. But we can only very conditionally talk about Trump's peacefulness. The growth of defense orders is beneficial to the industry, and in general, we must remember whoever is the president of America, there is a government apparatus, Congress, and security intelligence agencies. They are far from omnipotent, but they will not be ready to accept any policy without objection. They benefit from continuity, regardless of who sits in the Oval Office. Any new president would have the same problems, including Harris if she is elected. But the Democrats are better at working with the apparatus than the Trumpists (the old Republicans also interacted well with the bureaucracy, but they have now lost their positions). Finally, although American capital is divided into rival factions, one should not underestimate the ability of different factions to negotiate with each other. They will seek compromise under any president, although it is more difficult to achieve now than 10 years ago. Boris Yulievich: Even if Trump does not become president, this does not mean that there will be no supporters of his in American society. Do you think that another storming of the Capitol or another violent seizure of power by conservatives in the United States is possible? Boris Kagarlitsky: Trump's defeat, if it happens (which is very likely now), will demoralize his supporters. The storming of the Capitol was an exceptional episode after all. And Trump's bet on grassroots mobilization in 2020 unexpectedly worked against him. It would seem that by conducting grassroots mobilization, Trumpists are becoming like the left. We also advocate for this. The question is who and by what means will you ultimately mobilize. Trump has brought back into politics millions of representatives of the forgotten working class, mostly white, but not only. People who have historically been betrayed by the Democrats, who have rejected the progressive agenda. There is a great book about this by Tom Frank, "What Happened to Kansas," and these people, mostly not very educated, not very politically savvy, extremely provincial, tried to express their resentment, frustration, accumulated irritation, first by voting for Trump, and then, feeling that they had been screwed once again, that the system had bypassed them again, they rushed to storm the Capitol. And in the end, they only received another portion of humiliation, and at the same time, repression. But the Trumpist team also drew the conclusions of the "Leninists" who relied on mobilization - they were mostly purged (I'm not kidding, Bannon, for example, directly quoted Lenin). But the Trumpist team also drew conclusions from the "Leninists" who relied on mobilization from their ranks. And Trump tried to distance himself from grassroots activism, seeing it as a spontaneous, dangerous and uncontrollable force. Trumpism became more bourgeois, even more conservative, despite its populist rhetoric. Of course, it did not become more respectable, but it became consistently reactionary. In 2016, both Trump and the BREXIT supporters in England and even the National Front in France mixed reactionary xenophobic or anti-migrant slogans with social demands that should actually be put forward by the left. And I wrote then that such movements, alas, express a completely natural, legitimate social protest. Even Bernie Sanders acknowledged this at the beginning of his campaign. And then, when the Democratic party apparatus drowned him in the primaries using very dubious methods (and Bernie gave in), many of his supporters, on the contrary, went to Trump. And in Britain, too, in 2016, both the right and the left campaigned for BREXIT. In France, during the referendum on the European constitution, there was a similar situation. By the way, I was informed that recently during the debits of Svetov* and Sakhnin on "Live Nail" one of the viewers wrote that Kagarlitsky would be for Trump. In fact, I have never been for Trump, but in 2016 I showed the ambiguity of the situation when some, essentially progressive demands are put forward by right-wing populists. But since then the situation has changed (by the way, as in the story with Donbass, if we compare 2014 and 2022). Both Trump and the French nationalists and their British brothers have consistently abandoned any social issues. Now it is a purely reactionary movement, without any impurities. Moreover, in relation to workers, the right now behaves exactly the same way as the left did before. Like, they will not go anywhere from us, they will still vote for us and this is their fatal mistake. Theoretically, the left – the real left, the class-based left – now has the opportunity to regain the support of blue-collar workers: but it will not happen immediately and automatically. In the meantime, we are more likely to see increasing demoralization at the bottom of society. Boris Yulievich: Why is Trump and his ideas popular among Americans? Boris Kagarlitsky: Trump's popularity was due to the fact that he began to talk about problems whose very existence the liberal establishment (including its left wing in academic institutions) denied. Yes, the solutions offered were wild. For example, let's fence ourselves off from Mexico with a wall (by the way, I heard such an idea in prison - we need to build a concrete wall along the borders of Russia and fence ourselves off from the rest of the world, so Torzhok's IK-4 also has its own Trumpists). But the problem of uncontrolled migration does exist! It is clear that a poorly educated worker from the "rust belt" or a farmer from the American South, for whom the outside world is limited to Mexico and Canada, is ready to accept such answers. No other options are offered! And no matter how much we ridicule the ignorance of Trumpists, their behavior has its own logic and even the beginnings of common sense. Sadly, I do not always notice this in intellectuals. Boris Yulievich: In the last few years, conflicts that had been simmering for many years have been intensifying. Doesn't this remind us of the situation before the First World War? Boris Kagarlitsky: I have been seeing comparisons with the First World War, or rather the period preceding it, for a long time in a variety of texts. And indeed, there are similarities. The First World War was preceded by an unprecedented globalization of the economy, which ended with the exhaustion of markets. As a consequence, competition grew and, as Marxists of that time said, inter-imperialist rivalry intensified. Naturally, only libertarians believe that markets function by themselves. In reality, market competition inevitably spurs political confrontation, and in the most severe forms. But this is about similarities. There are also fundamental differences. Let's start with the fact that at the beginning of the 20th century, more or less stable blocs were formed: Germany and its allies against the old empires (England, France and Russia), which were joined by the United States, whose ruling class had chosen a non-aggressive strategy at that time. Instead of trying to push Britain out of the position of world hegemon, the US began to support it, simultaneously replacing it in this role. At first, partially. It is important that the arena of rivalry was the same territories, the same markets. Now the situation is qualitatively different. Only the Russian elite is trying to play by the rules of the late 20th century, and only some domestic dogmatic Marxists continue to analyze the situation in such categories. The fact is that China does not strive for hegemony in the world system at all, it is only forming a China-centric economic space around itself, using the rest of the world as a source of resources. Of course, it is necessary to export goods - to Europe, to the USA, to Russia. But Chinese capital does not consciously form new markets, does not try to reformat them, it only uses them. China's growth is becoming destructive for the world system, but precisely because there are no attempts to fight for hegemony. After all, hegemony is not just domination, but an orderly organization, the development of a system. There is nothing like that here. For the United States, a war with China has no prospects, which does not solve the main problem: as long as the neoliberal regime of global trade exists, China will use it. And if it is changed, then the whole system needs to be radically changed. Trump tried to introduce protectionist measures (which is painful for Chinese capital), but he is not going to change the system even in a reformist way (I am not even talking about a revolution). Nothing will work out that way. The crisis is growing, it will be accompanied by local wars, and then a series of revolutions. In general, as in the old Soviet joke: "There will be no war, but there will be such a struggle for peace that it will not seem like a little." Boris Yulievich: Do you see a threat of a new world war? Could the war between Israel and Palestine cause a world war? Boris Kagarlitsky: From what I said earlier, it logically follows that the conflict in the Middle East will not escalate into a world war. Not least because of the position of China, which does not need a war. It is not going to win anything back from the West. This is not peacefulness, but arrogant indifference. China needs peace, especially since the internal situation in the Middle Kingdom is not as strong as it seems. The paradox is that military conflicts are started by regional players, trying to drag in superpowers - the US and China, and in general everyone they can. The ruling clique in Israel is protecting itself from growing discontent in the country, shifting public attention to the war with an external enemy; this is Netanyahu's policy. But in reality, neither the US, nor China, nor even Iran need this. In general, it is a paradox: forces considered irresponsible and radical – Hezbollah, Iran – showed restraint, while Israel (a supposedly civilized democracy) demonstrates complete insanity. I have already written about the similarity between our situation and what is happening in Israel. Netanyahu understands that any end to the war is the end of his power. In Russia, we see influential forces that reason in a similar way. And if we return to the situation with Lebanon, the war is not being waged to defeat Hezbollah, but to prevent peace, when one will have to answer for everything. Including the war. Boris Yulievich: What must happen for a world war to start? Boris Kagarlitsky: As I have already said, we are not threatened by a new world war. We are threatened by the prolongation and expansion of numerous (or regional) conflicts, absorbing huge amounts of human lives and resources. The total casualties could be monstrous. They are already enormous. But this is not a world war between two opposing global camps. Moreover, I very much hope that the warring parties, themselves struck by a profound internal crisis, will gradually slide towards peace. It is impossible to fight endlessly, especially when these wars have neither purpose nor meaning in geopolitical terms. No one can defeat anyone, nor does anyone want to. However, a war for the sake of continuing a war is a dead end. If maintaining power requires an endless continuation of the war, it will not be possible to maintain power for too long. Alas, for many today peace is much more frightening than war. In the long term, peace is revolution. Or radical reforms. We are on the threshold of very big changes. Old Wallerstein, I think, was right when he predicted the end of the current world system (part of which, by the way, were world wars). https://rabkor.ru/columns/editorial-columns/2024/11/04/kagarlitsky-about-the-us-elections-trump-peace-negotiations-and-radical-changes/? Back |
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