 |
|
Serbia: on the demand for new elections The Vučić regime is facing the largest mass movement in the history of Serbia. It is the culmination of the masses’ experiences following six previous waves of mass movements under Vučić’s presidency. In the wake of previous movements, Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) not only managed to remain in power, but did so without needing to make significant concessions. The movement against Rio Tinto, as well as the ‘Serbia against violence’ movement following a spree of mass shootings, were both led by the opposition, and were followed by early elections. On those occasions, while the opposition increased its strength in parliament, they did not strive to lead the masses for a struggle to overthrow Vučić while he was at his most vulnerable. Likewise, in the course of the current protests, the leadership initially fell to the very same opposition parties, which from movement to movement have always demanded the bare minimum. Basing themselves on the same policies they pursued when the opposition itself was in power prior to Vučić, they have consistently failed to achieve any electoral victories. In these protests too, the opposition has proven itself incapable of bringing down Vučić. On account of their unpopularity, the opposition parties quickly retreated into the shadows of the current movement and leadership fell to the youth. Statements from the opposition parties have made it clear that they are completely cut off from the fighting spirit of the youth and from the masses, who are more than ready to deal with the regime. The formation of faculty occupations and mass plenums by the students was a qualitative leap that further radicalised the struggle, although the regime has not given in. Since then, the regime has made concession after concession. Its reputation has been undermined, yet the opposition has not only remained in the shadows, but has been strictly excluded from the students’ struggle. The opposition is being excluded because the parents of the students participating in the blockades have already had experience of such parties in power in the 2000s, and have seen their feeble leadership during previous movements. Voters for both pro and anti- regime parties, as well as non-voters, have rallied around the youth, on the condition that the movement rejects all the existing rotten political options. The rot of parliamentarism in Serbia Although it is generally accepted that the Vučić regime uses a thousand shady means to stay in power, it is symptomatic of the thinking of the opposition that it has blamed each of its defeats primarily on the regime’s maneuvers. Proponents of the opposition have gone so far as to accuse the Serbian people themselves of deserving Vučić for failing to vote for the opposition. A serious examination of these defeats has always seemed to be missing. But that is to be expected considering the ‘opposition’ today is mostly made up of representatives of the previous regime from 2000 to 2012, or else of ‘new’ people sharing practically identical policies. After the inspiring overthrow of the Milošević regime, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) coalition came to power. It based its programme on the so-called ‘democratisation’ and ‘modernisation’ of Serbia – doing away with the remaining legacy of ‘socialism’ – as well as the path to the European Union. After the terrible experience of the Milošević regime in the 1990s, the masses were looking for an answer. With a limited set of choices, they sought an answer in the DOS. The idea of a ‘modern’, ‘European’ Serbia found fertile ground at that time. The deformed workers’ states of the Eastern Bloc disintegrated ingloriously in the 1990s, and the bureaucracies carried out the restoration of capitalism. In many countries, brutal economic shock therapy was implemented that destroyed the living standards of the working class. The economic decline was equivalent to that following a devastating war. Serbia, on the other hand, moved more slowly towards capitalism. Milošević did carry out privatisation, but fearing an economic collapse like in the rest of the Eastern Bloc, he decided to carry it out at a more careful pace. On the other hand, like other countries of the former Yugoslavia, he used the war to cover up the plunder of public property, which he sold at a pittance to the emerging capitalist class. This slow pace of privatisation also gave the Serbian regime the opportunity to act somewhat more independently in relation to the imperialist powers of the West. But this glimmer of independence was ended by the NATO bombardment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Numerous defeats in wars, pressures from imperialism, and the opposition of the masses brought the DOS to power in 2000. But the romantic vision of a Serbia that would be like Switzerland quickly gave way to a harsh reality, as our International predicted. Parliamentary democracy continued to suffer regular crises, in which governments could not be formed due to conflicts that opened up between the former allies of the DOS coalition. A certain species of ‘democracy’ was cobbled together, but it came with widespread privatisation, mass layoffs and a collapse in living standards, similar to those in the rest of the Eastern Bloc during the 1990s. As the robbery of privatisation continued, corrupt politicians exploited legal loopholes to their personal benefit. There was high unemployment, informal work for little money was widespread, and businessmen close to the regime received contracts for public infrastructure projects, which were carried out using cost-cutting measures, and posed a great risk to the population. That’s right: we are not talking about the Serbian Progressive Party in 2025, but the Democrats in power during the 2000s. The IMF and the European Union imposed austerity measures and public sector cuts on Serbia, in order to pay off debts, privatise and prepare the ground for the domination of foreign capital over Serbia. With the economic crisis of 2008, the Serbian economy fell into recession in 2009, 2012 and 2014, alongside the European Union. Ultra-rich businessmen like Miroslav Mišković had established a practical monopoly on politics. All the while, there has never been any serious question of Serbia being accepted into the European Union, despite voting for pro-European options and brutally implementing austerity measures at its behest. In this climate, Aleksandar Vučić, hitherto of the Radical Party, made a pro-European turn and rode to power on the back of the failed policies of the Democrats. This is why the opposition studiously avoids any self-examination. Its policies created the monster we have in power today. Even in parliament, whilst they oppose and undermine the regime’s policies, they do so without offering an alternative policy that might connect in any way with the working class. Vučić’s maneuvers have further undermined parliamentarism in Serbia, through his sweeping control over government jobs, media, bots, thugs, rallies, call centers, and his crushing dominance in parliament, which has meant that the legislative and executive branches of the state have practically merged. He is assisting the further domination of Serbia by foreign capital, which is why the European Union has tacitly supported him amidst this mass movement. Parliament is there to maintain the outward appearance of the last vestige of bourgeois democracy, whilst elections have been stolen through bribery. But this illusion of democracy is not enough to satisfy the majority of the population, and that is precisely why mass movements have become a regular occurence in Serbia, as the parliamentary front has been rotting for decades. It is understandable why the sentiment, that Serbia has been in the grip of madness for the last 35 years, has been often expressed in the midst of the present movement. Milošević, the Democrats, Vučić: they are all representatives of the ruling class who implement policies in the interests of big business, domestic and foreign, as well as in the interests of their own personal gain. It is no wonder that, according to polls, the students enjoy greater support from the population than any political party since the introduction of multi-party politics. ‘Direct democracy’ In addition to the fact that they have distanced themselves from the political parties, and that the youth are seen as representing the future of Serbia, the students draw broad support because of the fact that they have based themselves on democratic plenums. These forums have allowed for open, democratic debate about goals of the movement, and have been effective mechanisms against those forces that would try to co-opt it. Without them, the students would not have been able to lead such an extraordinary movement. In this democratic process, the masses have demonstrated that they are capable of a much broader and deeper democracy than parliamentary democracy. Under the existing parliamentary system, even when we vote for ‘representatives’ who we think will implement our interests, we see how they almost always fail to do what they promise. Or worse, they regularly carry out policies to the direct detriment of the working class. Even before the Vučić era, parliamentary democracy in Serbia had all the appearance of a bad reality TV show. Politicians would engage in cajolery and name calling, but would rarely talk about policy – even if that was formally the reason they were placed there. It is this nonsense politics that has allowed Vučić to govern for so long. Indeed, he has repeatedly reiterated his gratitude to the opposition for their incompetence. Turnout in parliamentary elections in Serbia – which has remained below 60 percent since 2008 – is lower than the percentage of the population that now support the students. That is, the democratic methods of the students have a greater mandate than parliament itself! That is why, since the historic protest on 15 March, the students’ call to form citizens’ assemblies (zborovi) has gained traction. The students wanted to extend these organs of direct democracy to the rest of society, correctly understanding that they could not carry out this struggle alone unless the mass support they enjoyed became active support. The existence of the zborovi has, for the first time, presented an alternative to the leadership of the politicians of the political parties that have presided over the existing system for the past 35 years. What led to the step back towards parliamentarism? When the blockades and plenums began, there was enormous pressure from public opinion, including from the opposition, not to hold early elections. The masses did not trust Vučić to conduct fair elections, whilst the opposition did not feel confident that it had the support necessary among the masses to remove Vučić through parliamentary means. The student plenums represented a huge step towards mass democratic participation in politics, and the zborovi represented the potential for a revolutionary transformation in the democratic running of society. Yet suddenly, the movement has turned towards what had until recently been outright forbidden – the demand for early parliamentary elections has been passed in the student plenums. How did the movement go from rejecting elections to demanding elections? First, we must note that there is fatigue in the movement. Faculty occupations filled with students, and lively discussions at plenums have turned into routine procedural debates with far lower attendance. The most indefatigable students have continued to man the occupations, but the majority now only passively support them from home. Among the occupiers – as often happens in movements run on the basis of ‘direct democracy’, without elected representatives – cliques of unofficial leaders are forming. Nevertheless, the fatigue is certainly greater on the side of the regime. It has used all its tried-and-tested tactics to diffuse the movement, but without success. Vučić holds rallies that turn into fiasco after fiasco. The so-called ‘Ćaciland protest camp’ established by Vučić’s SNS party, supposedly established by ‘students who want to study’ and end the blockades, has only exposed what layers of society the regime relies upon for the sake of cultivating apparent support. Huge amounts of money have been spent on maintaining Vučić's image as a great leader, but the ‘great leader’ has revealed himself to be incompetent. His performances are increasingly schizophrenic, and even those who believed in him are beginning to lose confidence as he proves incapable of managing the situation. Conflicts are growing within the SNS, as different wings of this mafia party understand that the way out of the situation might be to drop Vučić, before he drops them. Sensing this weakness, prior to the students’ decision to call for elections, the opposition media increasingly raised the idea of forming a technocratic government, which resonated little among the students. It has been those students most sympathetic to the opposition that have undoubtedly been the main force behind the idea of early parliamentary elections. There is almost no opposition party that has not praised this move. In the course of the struggle, only those demands raised unanimously by all the faculties have become the official position of the students. Pressure was thus exerted on the students occupying the Faculty of Philosophy to give up the tactic of building up zborovi and preparations for a general strike, and instead to accept a ‘consensus’ established in other faculty occupations that there must be early elections. All of the plenums have now voted for a return to parliamentarism. It is not yet known who will make up the list of candidates, nor what exactly they will stand for. All that is known is that the students will determine who will be on the list. Not only that, but according to some reports, one thing that has been established is that the students themselves will not be on the list. This is a serious mistake for several reasons. The Achilles’ heel of the student movement from the start has been that it has focussed entirely on the common denominator uniting the movement, rather than raising demands that would push the movement forward. That is, the demand for justice for the victims of the canopy collapse has naturally been at the forefront, but at the expense of all other political issues being swept under the rug. This may have given unity to the movement, but it has also weakened it. It enjoys enormous support from society, but on the other hand the plenary debates have recoiled from offering any political programme to the movement. The plenums have thus de facto abdicated political leadership and are leaving it up to candidates from outside the student movement to fill up their electoral list. What is certain is that the list will suffer from all the same problems that have marred the plenums. If the student movement is composed of heterogeneous ideas, the list it draws up will also suffer from the same heterogeneity, reflecting the students’ consciousness. It will be a great mix of political views. There will certainly be well-intentioned people on the list, who will want to implement at least a minimal programme related to justice for the victims of the canopy collapse, if not something more. But a layer of those elected will see parliamentarism as a chance to kickstart their own political career. And when you put representatives in parliament for an entire term, they actually become independent of their voters and the people who appointed them. Instead, they will rub shoulders with establishment politicians and big business. In addition, some of the candidates will undoubtedly be individuals under the influence of the opposition. Nothing guarantees that the electoral candidates, without a clear programme and without real connections to the struggle, will enjoy anywhere near as much support as the student movement itself. This means that that list will probably have to be ready to compromise with other opposition parties, or even worse with the parties in power. The fact that the students announced that they would not be part of the list also indicates that a mass party, with a clear political programme formed through a process of debate, will not emerge from the movement. Rather, candidates will have a mandate to work more or less as they please. It is symptomatic of the present phase of the movement that the Zbor svih Zborova (assembly of all assemblies) in Novi Sad has supported this new demand on behalf of all its zborovi. It did not arrive at this decision by having each individual zbor separately discuss the demand before voting on at a joint meeting. Rather, the decision was taken on the basis that the zbor had previously voted to support all the students’ demands, before the call for new elections was raised, and therefore this carries over to supporting the latest decision. The zborovi have increasingly been reduced to a tool for mobilising people, rather than a forum for the democratic participation of the masses. Although the zborovi were supposedly intended to serve as a tool to guarantee the sovereignty of the people, whether intentionally or accidentally, the trend towards undermining discussion is undoubtedly an undemocratic maneuver that will undermine the masses’ connection with and trust in these organs. To strike a powerful blow against the regime, what is needed is to bring the working class into the movement on a mass scale. The students have understood this fact, and have correctly advocated for a general strike and the expansion of the zborovi. However, attempts in this direction have failed to overcome the resistance and passivity of the trade union bureaucrats. The students admirably brought all the trade unions together for May Day, and took an excellent initiative in raising the need to change the Labor Law and the Strike Law. But the union leaders showed all their weaknesses when they raised excuses for not taking up the students’ call for a general strike. They claimed it was too difficult to organise – as if they are not at the head of organisations with memberships comprising over 20 percent of the Serbian working class! If anyone could have prepared the ground for a general strike, it was the trade unions, but for the fact that their leaders have proven completely unworthy of the historic task before them. Although strike activity has increased, only the teachers have taken serious strike action. The rest of the working class has not joined them. They thus remained isolated in the struggle which they heroically carried on their backs. There is no way to force the working class into action. It must be equipped with a programme and, above all, with a leadership in which it has confidence. The students have attempted to overcome this social crisis through a step backwards towards parliamentarism. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the movement is over, nor that the workers’ struggle is over. Where is the movement going? The students have managed to build a historic movement – beginning with the largest protest ever organised in Serbia, and ending with the incredibly progressive demand for a general strike and the organisation of workers and citizens into zborovi. It is possible that the turn towards parliamentarism will only prove to be a temporary diversion. The question arises whether Vučić will even accept the demand for early elections. He emphasised that he is the one who decides when they will be called. Miloš Vučević, president of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), has said that the elections would be a disaster, as he is aware that the reputation of the party and the president have been significantly undermined. In the event of elections, the regime is certainly in a weak position. If they win, the movement could escalate, partly because of distrust in the election results, and partly because of the strength of the movement, which far exceeds the strength of those supporting the government. In the event of defeat, many SNS members could face imprisonment or forced exile. The regime is still trying to cause provocations that would give it an excuse to crush the movement. But all these provocations are failing, and even if they were to succeed, they would only risk further radicalising the movement. This could potentially trigger a general strike, or the expanding and centralising of the zborovi with the aim of organising a political expression for the movement. Ultimately, this movement is not only motivated by the desire for justice for the victims of the Novi Sad canopy collapse. It is motivated by the need to guarantee that such crimes will never happen again, and to show the entire ruling class that it cannot gamble with people’s lives. But we must be clear. Changing the government will not solve the root cause of corruption, which is capitalism. Arrogant politicians and businessmen will find ways to circumvent the law for personal gain, to the fatal detriment of working people. The students were absolutely correct when they sought to base themselves on the working class, even if that working class lacked the leadership necessary to achieve its historic calling: the socialist reorganisation of society under the democratic control of the working class itself. This can only be achieved by expanding the zborovi to every neighbourhood and workplace, and by centralising them across the Republic, through the right to elect and recall delegates. Such bodies of discussion, decision-making and organisation, which express the power of the masses, are the only alternative to the corrupt capitalist state. Without such a transformation, real social change is impossible. Only if the working class holds political power, instead of just participating in elections, and only if we abolish capitalism and introduce a planned economy, can we ensure that corruption is eradicated and our lives are in safe hands. https://marxist.com/serbia-on-the-demand-for-new-elections.htm Back |
 Links Search |
||||||
|
|||||||
